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Evaluation of the welfare cost of trade restrictions has long been a major 
concern of  economics and public policy. The founding fathers, both of 
our discipline and of our republic, were much concerned with this issue. 
Adam Smith complained that the deliberations of the legislature on these 
matters were directed by the “clamorous importunity of partial interests” 
rather than by  “an extensive view of  the general good,” while James 
Madison in his famous tenth Federalist paper on the dangers of “faction” 
observed that “shall domestic manufacturers be encouraged, and in what 
degree, by  restrictions  on foreign manufacture,  are questions which 
would be differently decided by the landed and manufacturing classes, 
and probably by  neither with a sole regard to justice and the public 
good.” 
In the technical literature of applied welfare economics as represented 
by Harberger (1959) and Johnson (1960), for example, the welfare costs 
of  exogenously given tariffs and quotas (or any taxes, subsidies, and 
quantitative restrictions)  are assessed, in the tradition of  Dupuit and 
Marshall, by calculating the areas of the “little triangles” of consumers’ 
and producers’ surplus lying beneath the demand and supply curves for 
the commodities on which these restrictions are placed. In this conven- 
tional  theory of  the cost of  protection the increased rents to factors 
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engaged in the protected industry are regarded as transfers to them from 
consumers or factors employed elsewhere in the economy, and are there- 
fore not considered as constituting a cost to society as a whole. 
Tullock (1967), however, rightly argues that various interest groups in 
the society would actively seek to promote the generation of these rents 
arising from the imposition of  tariffs while others whose interests are 
adversely affected would seek to prevent them. Both sides would absorb 
scarce resources in the conflict over the extent and structure of  trade 
restrictions, and the social value of these resources should be considered 
in addition to the conventional deadweight loss in arriving at estimates of 
the total welfare cost. Tullock illustrates his point by  means of  an ex- 
tended analogy with theft, for which expenditures on safes and locks by 
the potential victim, and on nitroglycerine and oxyacetylene torches by 
the thieves  constitute the  social costs of  the process of  transferring 
incomes from the pockets of  the law-abiding citizens to those of  the 
criminals.’ 
Our purpose in this paper is to incorporate Tullock’s valuable insight 
into the formal analysis of the welfare costs of a tariff. The tariff level will 
be determined endogenously in a general equilibrium model extended in 
the simplest possible way to incorporate the process of  tariff formation 
emerging from the clash of  opposing interest groups. The level of  the 
tariff , the  lobbying expenditures on  “tariff  seeking”  and  opposition 
thereto by the interest groups, and the associated deadweight losses will 
all be determined simultaneously within the same model. The analysis of 
this paper  could be  readily adapted to the topic of  this conference, 
namely, the response to import competition, by having import competi- 
tion initially trigger off tariff-seeking lobbying by the specific factor in the 
importable activity; this, in turn, would be opposed by the lobbying of the 
other specific factor in the model. 
The general equilibrium structure employed will be that of the “specific 
factors” model used by Haberler, Ohlin, and Viner in their classic studies 
and recently revived by Jones (1971) and others. Two goods, “food” and 
“manufactures,” are produced, with “land” specific to food and “capi- 
tal” specific to manufactures. There is a constant returns to scale produc- 
tion function for each good, with the specific factor and labor as the 
arguments. Labor  is homogeneous  and freely transferable  from  one 
sector to the other. The international terms of  trade are taken as given, 
and there is perfect competition in all factor and commodity markets. 
The supply of  labor and of  both specific factors is fixed. 
In the absence of trade the relative price of food and manufactures will 
be determined by domestic demand conditions. With given factor sup- 
plies and technology, the rentals per unit of land and capital, equal to the 
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be determined as functions of the relative price of the two goods. If  the 
given international terms of trade are such that the country has a compar- 
ative advantage in manufactures then the rental per unit of capital, and 
hence the total rents accruing to this specific factor, will fall as a result of 
trade while the rental per unit of land and the total rents of the landown- 
ing class will rise in terms of  food and fall in terms of  manufactures as 
labor is transferred from the former to the latter sector in response to the 
opportunity to engage in trade. 
Suppose that both the landed and manufacturing interests are orga- 
nized into Madisonian “factions” or pressure groups capable of influenc- 
ing the political process with labor being purely passive. The landed 
interest would try to introduce a tariff on food at a prohibitive level if  they 
could get away with it, whereas the manufacturing interest would try to 
preserve free trade. Depending upon the relative strengths and commit- 
ments of the two sides it is plausible to think that some tariff between zero 
and the prohibitive level will emerge. The social value of  the resources 
used up by both sides in this struggle would constitute a welfare cost over 
and above the familiar deadweight loss associated with whatever tariff 
level emerges from the political process. 







= outputs of food and manufactures, 
= fixed supplies of  land, capital, and labor, 
= labor allocated to food and manufactures, 
= labor used in the political process by the landowning and 
= fixed international price of food in terms of manufactures, 
= rate of tariff on imports of  food, 
= domestic price of  food in terms of  manufactures, 
= real wages of  labor in terms of  manufactures, 
= rental per unit of  capital in terms of  manufactures, 
= rental per unit of  land in terms of  food. 
capitalist interest groups, 
The structure of the model is easily specified. Production functions for 
the two goods are 
(1) 
(2)  M =  M(LM,K), 
F = F(LF,  T)  , 
with constant returns to scale, positive first derivatives with respect to all 
arguments, and diminishing returns to labor in each case. The marginal 
product of each specific factor is an increasing function of the associated 
labor input. 
Profit maximization and perfect competition result in 226  Ronald Fmdlay/Stanislaw Wellisz 
(3) 
(4) 
The domestic price ratiop  is connected to the given international terms 
of  trade IT  by the relation 
(7)  p = (1 + t)m 
where the tariff rate t is an endogenous variable to be determined by the 
operation of the political process as influenced by the pressure groups 
representing the landed and manufacturing interests. 
Brock and Magee (1978) summarizes their own pioneering research on 
the political economy of tariffs, reported in a series of  working papers. 
They apply sophisticated game-theoretic mathematical approaches to 
modeling the behavior of  voters, parties, and lobbies in electoral pro- 
cesses that  determine tariff  levels. For our present  purposes a much 
simpler formulation of the political process that can perhaps be consid- 
ered as a “reduced form” of  the Brock-Magee framework is possible. 
Taking political institutions and attitudes in the country as given, we 
assume that a tariff level is determined as a stable function of  the re- 
sources committed to the political process by  each of  the two interest 
groups. For convenience let labor be the sole input used by both sides in 
their political activities. This leads to the hypothesis that 
(8)  t=t(LT,LK), 
which states that  a determinate tariff  results once the input of  each 
interest group is specified. It is clearly reasonable to suppose that 
at  -<O,  at  ->O, 
dLT  aLK 
implying that there are “diminishing returns” to both groups from partic- 
ipation in political activity. The positive increments in the tariff level 
resulting from successive unit increments in the input of  the protariff 
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antitariff group also get smaller and smaller in absolute value. No com- 
pelling argument can be found, at the present level of  generality, for 
attaching any restrictions on the sign of the cross-derivative. It is assumed 
that both LT  and LK  receive the going wage w. 
Equilibrium in the labor market requires 
(9)  L,+  L,+L,+  LK= L. 
To the extent that they are successful the activities of  the pressure 
groups constitute voluntary public goods for the individual landowners 
and capitalists. The “free rider” problem pointed out by Olson (1965) in 
this context is assumed to be solved somehow, so that we leave aside the 
internal organization of  the groups, each of  which is treated as a single 
“rational” agent that seeks to maximize its “class” interest in the political 
process. It should be apparent, however, that this collective action by 
landowners and capitalists only takes place in the “political” sphere, 
atomistic competition being the rule in the “economic” sphere of  the 
production of food and manufactures and the distribution of the income 
arising therefrom. The two spheres are, however, obviously linked into a 
single interdependent system by virtue of  the endogenous nature of the 
tariff. 
Before considering the explicit determination of LT  and LK, it will be 
helpful to note some properties of  the model that follow if LT  and LK  are 
taken as given. From (8) the value of t is determined and hence of p from 
(7). Defining the labor available for production as 
(10)  LA = L -  (LT  + LK), 
it follows readily from the structure of the model that F, M,  r,  q,  and y are 
each determined as functions of p  and LA alone with the properties 
aM  ->o, 
aP  aLA 
ar  ->O,  ar  ->O, 
aP  aLA 
Assuming that there would be free trade in the absence of  any political 
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manufacturers are purely defensive in nature, the income of the landown- 
ers in terms of  manufactures when LT  equals zero would be m(z,  L)  T. 
The net benefit from engaging in the political process to the landowning 
class is therefore 
(16)  -  ‘TT~(~F,  L)  T -  w [  p (LT,  LK),  (L -  LT  -LK) 1 LT 
in which  LK is taken as a parameter.  Note  that  the second term  is 
independent of both LT  and LK  and is therefore a constant determined by 
the given values of  IT,  L,  and T. The dependence of  p  on LT and LK 
follows from (7) and (8). The first-order condition fotmaximizing NT 
with respect to LT  is 
p  dr  LT  ap  LT  ar 
(l+--)-  -  +-  - 
which states, in elasticity form, that the marginal contribution of  LT  in 
raising land rentsprT  should be equal to the marginal cost of LT. Notice 
that an increase in LT  has three separate effects on the income from land. 
It increases p,  which induces an increase in r,  both of  which raise the 
income of laidowners, but an increase in LT  does reduce 1: at constant p, 
which works in the opposite direction. It is assumed that the negative 
effect is small relative to the positive effects so that the sign of the entire 
term in parentheses on the LHS of (17) is positive. This condition is quite 
plausible and is indeed necessary for any expenditure on lobbying to be 
effective at all. The marginal cost of  LT  is greater than w since 
P  aw  LT  aP  and-  __  - - -  LT  aw  -- 
w  dLT  aP  P  dLT 
in the coefficient of  y on the RHS of  (17) are both positive. 
If  f denotes the optimal tariff (possibly prohibitive) obtainable by the 
landed interest in the absence of any defensive measures by the manufac- 
turing interest, iT  the amount of  labor used by  the landed interest to 
achieve this, and 4 the resulting rental per unit of  capital, then the net 
benefit to the manufacturers of  entering the political process to protect 
their incomes would be 229  Endogenous Tariffs, Trade Restrictions, and Welfare 
in which the second term is a constant independent of LK.  Maximizing  NK 
with respect to LK, treating LT  as a parameter, requires 
qaP  P  aLK  LK  4  aLK  aq  IqK  LK 
-  __  P  aq . LK  --+--  aP  I 
(19) 
-  - [ I+--+  LK  aw  P  awLK  aP  ] w 
w  aLK  w  ap  p  aLK 
which states that the marginal return from employing  LK  amount of labor 
to raise the income from capital should be equal to its marginal cost. The 
first term in the coefficient of  the LHS is the product of  two negative 
terms and therefore positive, while the second term is negative. It is again 
natural to suppose that the coefficient is on balance positive, making it 
worthwhile for the manufacturing interest to adopt defensive lobbying 
activities. 
Given LK the optimum LT  for the landed interest is determined by 
(17), while given LT  the optimum LK  for the manufacturing interest is 
determined by  (19). The “reaction functions” showing the optimal re- 
sponse by each group given the action of  the other can be obtained by 
total differentiation of the first-order conditions (17) and (19). These can 
be expressed as 
a2Nr 
aLi 
The denominators of  (20) and (21) have to be negative to fulfill the 
second-order conditions for maximization of  NT and NK so that the slope 
of  each reaction function depends upon the sign of  the corresponding 
cross-partial in the numerator. Unfortunately, however, each of  these 
cross-partials is the sum of  a  long succession of  individual terms of 
conflicting or indeterminate signs. We therefore simply assume that, 
whatever their slope, the reaction functions have a unique and “stable” 
intersection  defining a  Cournot-Nash  equilibrium  in  the  “political” 
sphere with LF  and Lz  as the optimal inputs for each group consistently 
with the actions of the other. The equilibrium net benefits from engaging 
in the political process, N$ and Ng, can be determined from (16) and 
(18). It is assumed that both are nonnegative; i.e., it is worthwhile for 230  Ronald Findlay/Stanislaw Wellisz 
each group to engage in the political process. The value oft*  and all the 
other eight variables of  the system can be determined by equations (1) to 
(9) after  LF  and Lg are known. We have thus depicted the general 
equilibrium of  an economy with an endogenous tariff level. 
The welfare cost of the endogenous tariff t* is depicted in figure 8.1. 
The transformation curve TT corresponds to the situation in which the 
entire labor force L is used for productive activity. The free trade levels of 
production and consumption are determined by the points a and c where 
the slopes of  TT and the maximum attainable indifference curve are 
equal to the given world price ratio IT. If  a tariff of  level t* were to be 
imposed exogenously, the standard analysis indicates that the production 
point would move to b on TT, where the slope is equal top* = (1 + f*)V, 
and the consumption point tog, where the slope of the indifference curve 
is also equal top*.  The terms of trade remain unchanged at IT.  We make 
here the usual assumption that the entire proceeds of the tariff revenue 
are  returned directly to the private sector. The welfare cost of the tariff is 
therefore measured in principle by the difference in utility levels between 
-  c and g. 
When the tariff level t* is endogenously determined by  a resource- 
using political process, however, the transformation curve TT is shifted 
inward to T‘T’, since the labor force available for production is now 
reduced by (L; + Lg).  The production point is at b’ on T‘T‘, where the 
slope is equal top*.  The reduction in the available labor force reduces the 
outputs of both goods at constant prices, by virtue of (11) and (12), in the 
context of  the “specific factors” model that we are using. If we continue 
to assume that the tariff revenue is returned directly to the private sector, 
the consumption point will shift tog’,  withgandg’ both lying on the Engel 
curve corresponding to relative price p*.  It is therefore apparent that the 
welfare cost of  an endogenous tariff is higher than that of  an indepen- 
dently given tariff of  the same rate. 
At this point it would be of some interest to compare the result just 
obtained with those of  Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1979). In their model 
the tariff rate is set exogenously, as in the standard analysis. However, 
instead of assuming that the tariff revenue is distributed to the population 
according to some independently specified rule, they postulate a “rev- 
enue-seeking’’ activity that uses scarce resources to influence the alloca- 
tion of the tariff revenue. The activity is also assumed to operate under 
competitive conditions so that in the final equilibrium position a dollar’s 
worth of resources is used up for every dollar of  revenue that the given 
tariff rate generates. The analysis  is conducted in terms of the two-by-two 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model with the “revenue-seeking’’ activity 
incorporated into it. The world price ratio is assumed to be given, just as 
in the present model. 231  Endogenous Tariffs,  Trade Restrictions, and Welfare 
0 
Fig. 8.1 
An apparently paradoxical result that the authors obtain is that welfare 
can be higher in the presence of “revenue seeking” than it would be in the 
case of  the conventional calculation of  the welfare loss from an exoge- 
nously given tariff. As they note, the key to the paradox is the Johnson 
(1967) demonstration that capital accumulation in the presence of a tariff 
on the capital-intensive good can reduce welfare, since it is possible for 
the value of production at world prices to decline even though it of course 
goes up at the tariff-inclusive domestic price ratio. The key to Johnson’s 
result in turn is the Rybczynski theorem, since the extra capital reduces 
the output of the labor-intensive exportable while increasing the output 232  Ronald Findlay/Stanislaw Wellisz 
of  the capital-intensive importable, thus making it possible for the total 
value of  production at world prices to decline. If  capital were to be the 
sole input used in “revenue seeking,” then application of  the Johnson 
reasoning in reverse would show how it is possible for welfare to increase 
as a result of that activity. To the extent that labor is also used in “revenue 
seeking,” welfare would decline, but it is clearly possible that a sufficient 
degree of  capital intensity could produce a net increase in welfare. 
As Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1979) note, another way of  expressing 
this result is in terms of the shadow prices of  the factors of  production. 
Following Little and Mirrlees (1969) the shadow prices of  nontraded 
primary inputs can be defined as the change in the value of production at 
world prices resulting from a unit increase in the availability of the input.* 
When the Johnson “immiserizing” case arises the shadow price of capital 
is negative, thus making it possible for the existence of “revenue seeking” 
to raise the level of  welfare 6 la Bhagwati-Srinivasan. 
In terms of  the model presented here the shadow price of  labor is 
clearly positive, since a change in the availability of  labor will change the 
output of both goods in the same direction. Thus the “tariff-seeking” and 
opposing activities involved in generating the endogenous tariff must 
result in a decline in welfare so long as labor is the only input used in those 
activities, as was assumed here. However, it is apparent that the specific 
factor used in the production of  the importable could have a negative 
shadow price, since output of  the importable is increased by one more 
unit of this factor being available but the output of the exportable falls as 
result of  the diversion of  labor to the importable sector that this would 
cause.  The value of  total production  increases at  the tariff-inclusive 
domestic price but could decline at world prices. Hence the Bhagwati- 
Srinivasan paradox could arise in the present context, if  this input were 
also used in the “tariff-seeking” and opposing activities on a sufficient 
scale relative to labor: and then the welfare cost of  the endogenous tariff 
could be less than the welfare cost of  an identical tariff levied without 
such tariff-seeking and opposing activities. 
An unconventional implication of the model presented here is that the 
welfare loss is not a monotonically increasing function of  the tariff level. 
A low tariff resulting from an intense struggle that absorbs a large volume 
of resources in political activity could be worse, from the standpoint of 
overall welfare, than a higher tariff that is not vigorously opposed by the 
free  trade forces. Some wars may simply not be worth winning, or even 
fighting. Constitutional amendments to outlaw tariffs would clearly be 
desirable, but the sort of  continuing political struggle over an annual 
trade bill that we have described would simply be “capitalized” if such an 
amendment were to be a genuine possibility. A pluralist democracy of 
checks and balances between conflicting interest groups, as described by 
Dahl(l956) and other political scientists, is unlikely to produce a stable 233  Endogenous Tariffs, Trade Restrictions, and Welfare 
and enduring free trade regime except under exceptional circumstances 
such as those existing in  Victorian England, where  a world  empire 
provided expanding opportunities to all social classes and serious rivals 
for industrial supremacy had not yet a~peared.~ 
It remains true, of  course, that free trade is the first-best social opti- 
mum in the absence of national monopoly power over the terms of trade. 
The question is whether and how that optimum can be attained. The 
traditional approach assumes away the question by postulating the exis- 
tence of  a benign, omniscient government that can use nondistortionary 
taxes and subsidies to place society at any point of  the utility-possibility 
frontier. Coase (1960) argued that, in the absence of  transaction and 
negotiation costs, private individuals themselves could work out a system 
of mutually beneficial deals with side payments to compensate losers that 
would attain a Pareto-optimal solution. However, the absence of  free 
trade for most of  the world’s recorded history points to the reality of 
suboptimal conflict situations of  the sort that we have tried to analyze in 
this paper with very elementary economic tools. 
Notes 
1. Also  see the valuable paper of  Krueger  (1974) for a theoretical analysis of  “rent 
seeking” where the rents on import quotas, exogenously imposed, are sought competi- 
tively. The Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1979) paper discussed below provides a critique of  the 
Krueger contention  that such rent seeking must be welfare-worsening, noting the inherently 
second-best nature of  the problem. It also introduces the terminology of  “tariff seeking” 
and “revenue seeking” used below. 
2.  See Findlay and Wellisz (1976) and Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1978) for the derivation 
of  shadow prices for nontraded primary inputs. 
3. See Kindleberger (1978) and Pincus (1977) for interesting historical examples of the 
political economy of  tariffs. 
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Comment  Richard A. Brecher 
Introduction 
The paper by Findlay and Wellisz is well written, interesting, stimulat- 
ing, and worthwhile. It extends the theory of  rent seeking in an open 
economy by allowing such activity to determine economic policy endoge- 
nously, thereby departing from Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), who 
instead permit revenue seeking to redistribute the proceeds of an exoge- 
nously given tax. In the Findlay-Wellisz model, an import tariff results 
from intergroup conflict expressed through lobbying, which gives rise to 
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an equilibrium of  the Cournot-Nash variety. The following comments 
will focus on certain technical aspects of the paper, some possible exten- 
sions of  the  model,  and various policy implications of  the  analysis. 
Limitations on space will keep these comments very brief, permitting 
only a slight sketch of the main arguments, whose details must be kept to 
a bare minimum here. 
Technical Aspects 
Equations (16) and (18) could be simplified by  elimination of  their 
constant components, nr(.rr,L)T and ~[T(I+  i),  (I -  LT)]K,  respec- 
tively. The central analysis  would be essentially unaffected by this simpli- 
fication, which leads to straightforward maximization of pressure-group 
income net of lobby costs, without unnecessary reference to some con- 
stant benchmark. 
In discussing equation (19), the authors assume that a(qK)IaLK  >  0. It 
may be noted, however, that necessary and sufficient for this result is the 
plausible condition that aM/aLK > 0. In other words, if  and only if 
additional lobbying by capitalowners increases output of  manufactures 
(as might reasonably be expected), the corresponding increase in manu- 
facturing employment must (ceteris paribus) raise capital’s gross income 
(before deducting the lobby costs), for well-known reasons connected 
with diminishing returns to labor. By similar reasoning in equation (17), 
however, a(prT)laLT>  Oifbut not onlyif aFIaL,>O,since  aplaLT>  0. 
In  the present  paper,  the equilibrium tariff  must  be  nonnegative, 
because the authors assume that lobbying by capital (the sector-specific 
factor in exportables) is purely in defense of free trade. It might be more 
realistic and equally tractable to remove the constraint that f 2  0, thereby 
generalizing the discussion to admit the plausible possibility of subsidized 
trade in the lobby-determined equilibrium. In this case, the reaction 
curve for capitalowners would simply be modified to have LK >  0 (rather 
than LK  = 0) when LT = 0, without any serious complication of  the 
analysis. 
Even in the absence of  explicit rent seeking, the government might 
impose a tariff to anticipate the latent preferences of  voters within the 
different  interest  groups.  If  the subsequent  introduction  of  lobbying 
alters the government’s perception of these preferences, the tariff might 
then be reduced below the initial (lobby-free) level. This possible move- 
ment toward the free-trade situation would be an efficiency gain to be 
weighed against the resource cost of  lobbying, to arrive properly at an 
overall economic assessment of  rent-seeking activity. 
The net costs of lobbying might be overemphasized also by the paper’s 
focus on the full-employment economy. In the presence of  unemployed 
resources, the introduction of lobbying need not alter national income at 
any given tariff, but the associated increase in employment might well be 
considered socially desirable nevertheless. 236  Ronald Findlay/Stanislaw Wellisz 
As a final point on technical detail, it might be more appropriate for 
each pressure group to maximize its utility rather than its income (NT  or 
NK).  This modification could have some noticeable implications for the 
analysis. For example, as could readily be shown, stronger conditions 
would be needed to ensure a positive LT  intercept for the reaction curve 
of landowners. This line of discussion need not be pursued here, since the 
utility-maximizing approach to lobbying is  adopted  by  Feenstra  and 
Bhagwati in chapter 9. 
Possible Extensions 
If the cost of negotiation between landowners and capitalowners were 
assumed to be less than prohibitive, it might pay these two groups to 
collude as a type of cartel, which maximizes (and internally redistributes) 
joint rents (or utility). The cartel solution could even emerge automati- 
cally without need for intergroup negotiation, if  landowners and capital- 
owners owned land and capital in the same proportion. Since defensive 
lobbying at cross purposes would be obviously unprofitable for the cartel, 
the resulting equilibrium must have LT  2  LK = 0 (or LK 2  LT  = 0 if 
trade subsidies were allowed). Note that optimal policy for the cartel 
could be free trade-if  a “small” tariff would create exactly offsetting 
gains and losses for landowners and capitalowners, respectively-even 
when the Cournot-Nash equilibrium involves a positive tariff. Free trade 
would also arise if  the cartel were extended to include the remaining 
factor (labor) or if  everyone owned all three factors in the same propor- 
tion. 
Although the paper draws the battle lines between owners of land and 
of capital, other sorts of  conflict are worth considering. For example, 
chapter 9 by Feenstra and Bhagwati focuses instead upon the familiar 
division between capital and labor, within the traditional trade-theoretic 
model with  no  sector-specific factors.  It might  also be  rewarding to 
consider the interesting possibility of  pressure groups that cut across 
national boundaries. 
In the traditional (lobby-free) theory of  tariffs for the small-country 
case, the welfare cost due to the well-known tariff-induced distortions in 
production and consumption increases monotonically with the tariff. If 
instead the magnitude of this cost were the same for all tariff levels (t2  O), 
it could be effectively ignored in this context. Once the present paper 
highlights lobbying as  an  additional  tariff-induced cost, it would  be 
worthwhile to explore the relationship between size of  tariff and total 
rent-seeking resources. Since these variables (t  and LT + LK)  are en- 
dogenously determined within the model, their relationship could be 
explored only by  allowing changes in some exogenously given param- 
eters. 
Although the most visible of  these parameters are IT,  K,  L, and T, 
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lows: t = t (LT,  LK; G),  where G is an index of government resistance to 
lobbying, so that dtlaG <  0 (given that negative tariffs are excluded). In 
other words, if the government becomes more willing to bear the political 
consequences of resisting pressure for tariffs, the level of protection will 
fall (ceterisparibus).  For the sake of concreteness, let the reaction curves 
be positively sloped (implying that a2NT/dLTdLK  >  O and d2NK/aL&T 
>  0). From the perspective of landowners, a rise in G looks like a rise in 
LK, and hence their reaction curve shifts to a higher LT  for each LK 
(provided that d2NT/dLTdG  > 0). The reaction curve of  capitalowners, 
however, shifts (except at the origin) to a lower LK  for each LT  (provided 
that d2NKIaLKaG  <  O),  since they interpret the rise in G as a fall in Lp 
Given this asymmetric pattern of  reaction-curve shifts, the direction of 
change in t and LT  + LK  appears to be ambiguous, at the present level of 
generality. It therefore seems, for example, that a “small” increase in 
government resistance could lead to a larger tariff and more total lob- 
bying, even though complete resistance could cause t = LT  = LK  = 0. To 
obtain a definite relationship between t and LT  + LK, however, further 
restrictions on the model probably would be needed. 
Policy Implications 
In the case analyzed by  Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), since an 
exogenously given tariff generates revenue-seeking activity, the costs of 
this activity can be attributed to the tariff. In the Findlay-Wellisz  paper, 
however, the tariff cannot really be blamed for the associated costs of 
lobbying, since both of  these variables are endogenously determined 
within the model. These costs in this case therefore must be attributed to 
something more basic. For example, perhaps lobbying is simply a natural 
consequence of  a democratic system, which permits interest groups to 
operate freely and legally. From a somewhat different perspective, rent 
seeking might be viewed as due ultimately to the particular division of 
power in a national constitution, which enables the government to levy 
taxes attractive to various lobbies. Alternatively, the ultimate source of 
rent seeking might be unequal factor-ownership ratios, which make it 
possible for tariffs to redistribute income among individuals. Depending 
upon which of these (or other) viewpoints is adopted, the role and focus 
of policy may be quite different. Needless to say, moreover, policymak- 
ers must also consider the costs of  any structural change contemplated, 
including the lobbying costs to oppose or reverse such change, as well as 
the rent seeking associated with the new environment. 
According to a central proposition of the paper, a higher tariff might be 
associated with  a higher level of  welfare, for reasons relating to the 
endogeneity of  economic policy. It may be noted, however, that this 
unconventional result can also occur in models where the tariff is exoge- 
nously given. An example of  such an occurrence could be constructed 
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income-consumption curve C,C,Ci  rightward until consumption point C, 
lies instead where line 8  J intersects the world-price line drawn through 
point  P,, without  reversing the direction of  international  trade.  (Al- 
though this constructed equilibrium is potentially unstable-because  the 
cost of  further revenue seeking would be less than the tariff revenues 
resulting-instability  could  be  avoided  by  appropriately  limiting the 
amount of  earnable revenues in the manner suggested by Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan 1980.) A tariff-induced improvement in welfare for nationals 
of a small country might also arise when foreign-owned factors of produc- 
tion are present within the country, as shown by Bhagwati and Brecher 
(1980)  and  Brecher  and  Bhagwati  (1981).  It would  be  interesting, 
moreover, to consider the policy implications of combining the foreign- 
ownership and revenue-seeking analyses for the case in which domestic 
lobbies are operated locally by  foreign interests based within the host 
country. 
Conclusion 
In short, the paper by Findlay and Wellisz is a most welcome contribu- 
tion. Although the above discussion has been necessarily brief, it is hoped 
that the foregoing comments help to suggest the wide scope and broad 
significance of  the analysis pursued by the authors. 
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Comment  Leslie Young 
Introduction 
Findlay and Wellisz have  captured an  important issue of  political 
economy within  a simple and lucid model which should be useful in 
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attacking a wide range of  questions.' Their contribution is thus most 
valuable and provocative. We shall show how their model can be sim- 
plified even further using duality theory. Using this simplification, we 
show that the lobbying equilibrium need not be unique. This has interest- 
ing implications for the political economy of tariffs. Finally, we point out 
that the equilibrium of  the model depends on the choice of  numeraire. 
This undesirable feature can be removed by assuming that the political 
factions maximize utility rather than profits. 
A Dual Approach 
Findlay and Wellisz consider how lobbying affects the rents on land 
and capital. This approach leads to rather complicated first-order condi- 
tions for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of lobbying. Simpler conditions can 
be obtained if  we assume that each faction maximizes revenue net of 
wages. This objective function is identical to that of  Findlay and Wellisz 
when there are constant returns to scale in production  (so that pure 
profits are zero). 
Let  RT(p,w)  and  RK(w)  be  the  net  revenue  from production  of 
farmers and manufacturers when the domestic price of  food in terms of 
manufactures is p  and the wage in terms of  manufactures is w,  i.e., 
RT(P,W)  =  pF(p,w)  -  wLdp,w), 
RK(w)  = M(w) -  wLM(w), 
where F(p,w)  and M(w)  are the supply functions of food and manufac- 
tures and LF(p,w)  and LM(w)  are the derived demand functions for 
farm and manufacturing labor. By  Hotelling's lemma (Varian 1978, p. 
31): 
-  LdP7W) 
aRT  aRT -  -=F(p,w)  -- 
aP  aw 
--  aRK - -  L,(p,w). 
aw 
Farmers take as given the lobbying LK  of  manufacturers and choose 
lobbying LT to maximize production profits net of  lobbyists' wages: 
maxRT@,w) -  wLT. 
LT 
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Using the dual relations (l),  this reduces to 
aP  aw  aw  ap 
aLT  aLT  ap  aLT 
F-=w+(L,+LT)(-+-*-). 
The left-hand side gives the effect on the revenue from food sales of the 
marginal change in domestic price from additional lobbying. The right- 
hand side gives the marginal rise in wage costs from additional lobbying. 
This equals the wage of the marginal lobbyist plus the effect on the total 
wage bill of  the wage rise resulting from lobbying. This wage rise is the 
result of  (1) the increased demand for lobbyists and (2) the increased 
demand for farm labor as a result of  the induced rise in food prices. 
Manufacturers take as given the lobbying LT of  farmers and choose 
lobbying LK  to maximize production profits net of  lobbyists’ wages: 
maxRK(w) -  WL~ 
LK 
An analysis similar to that above yields the first-order condition 
(3) 
aw  aw  ap 
0 = w + (LK+ LM)(--  + -.-  1.  aLK  ap  aLK 
The interpretation of  (3) is similar to that of  (2). 
Thus a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  lobbying has been characterized by 
first-order conditions (2) and (3), which have straightforward interpreta- 
tions. 
Uniqueness of  the Nash Equilibrium 
In discussing the welfare implications of  their  model, Findlay and 
Wellisz state: “An unconventional implication of  the model presented 
here is that the welfare loss is not a monotonically increasing function of 
the tariff level. A low tariff resulting from an intense struggle that absorbs 
a large volume of  resources could be worse, from the standpoint of 
overall welfare, than a higher tariff that is not vigorously opposed. . . .” 
If  the lobbying equilibrium were unique, as Findlay and Wellisz assume, 
then varying tariff levels could arise only from variations in some para- 
meter of  the model such as endowments, production possibilities, or 
lobbying effectiveness. Given such changes in the underlying structure, 
there is no reason to suppose that welfare losses decrease with reduced 
tariff levels-whether  or not these are the outcome of  a more intense 
political struggle. However, if  the lobbying equilibrium were not unique, 
then a more interesting interpretation of  the Findlay-Wellisz statement 
would be possible: in a model withJixed parameters there could be two 
equilibria, one of which involves lower tariffs and lower welfare because 
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We can give an example of  this using standard assumptions. Suppose 
that the resources and techniques available to farmers and manufacturers 
imply production functions: 
F=L$,M=LL  a>O. 
Suppose also that the domestic price p  is determined  by  lobbying as 
follows: 
p(LT,LK)  = L$L,"  d>O,e>O. 
If Lo is the total supply of  labor, then define 
L=Lo- LT- LK,r~l/(l  +pl'(l-u)). 
Elementary (but tedious) calculations2 show that the first-order condi- 
tions (2)  and (3)  become 
1  + r(d + 1 -  U) + (1 -  a)LT/L 
+ Lrd(r -  l/a)/LT=  0, 
2 -  a + r(e  +a -  1)  + (1 -  u)LK/L 
-  Lre(1 -  r)/LK  = 0. 
We have computed numerical solutions for the case Lo = 10, a = .75. If 
(A)  d = .5, e = .5, then there are two solutions (all numbers are rounded 
to two decimal places): 
L$= .SS,Lk = .19 sop(L;,Lk) = 2.15, 
L$= 1.12, L$ = 1.09 sop(L$,L$) = 1.01. 
If  (B)  d  = .25, e = .5, then there are again two solutions: 
L$= .53,Lk = .12sop(L;,Lk) = 2.47, 
L$= .67, L$ = 1.13sop(L$,L$>  = .90. 
Cases (A)  and (B)  illustrate the point made by Findlay and Wellisz 
within a model with fixed parameters. In each case, the solution (Li,L&) 
involves a high domestic price but few resources in lobbying whereas the 
solution (L$,L$) involves a lower domestic price arising from a more 
intensive political struggle. Clearly the diversion of resources to lobbying 
in the second solution could result in lower welfare despite the reduction 
in tariff level. 
More generally, nonuniqueness of  the Nash equilibrium implies that 
the data of  the political and economic system need not determine the 
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then attempts to “explain”  tariff  levels by  the effectiveness and the 
putative gains from lobbying (see section 10.5 of  this volume) could be 
chimerical. 
Choice of  Numeraire and Utility-maximizing Factions 
In most economic models a change of  numeraire does not alter the 
optimal choice of  firms since it merely scales up their maximands by  a 
factor they treat as parametric: the relative price. In the Findlay-Wellisz 
model, however, firms seek to manipulate this relative price, so a change 
of  numeraire does alter their optimal choice. For example, if  farmers seek 
to maximize net profits expressed in terms of  manufactures, then the 
first-order condition is 
If  they seek to maximize net profits expressed in terms of  food, i.e., 
{RT -  wLT}/p,  then the first-order condition is 
p-{RT  d  -  wLT} -  {RT -  wLT} -  aP  = 0. 
dLT  aLT 
Since ap/aLT  # 0, this condition clearly leads to a different choice. Simi- 
lar remarks apply for the manufacturer. 
These observations bring out the inappropriateness of the assumption 
that each faction maximizes its profits. If prices are regarded as paramet- 
ric, then, whatever the numeraire, firms should maximize profits in order 
to maximize the utility of their owners. However, this will not be true if 
the firm is actively manipulating the prices its owners face us consumers. 
In such a situation, it is more reasonable to assume that each faction is 
concerned with maximizing a utility function in which profits appear as an 
argument. The assumption that the preferences of  each faction can be 
represented by a single utility function is in the spirit of  the Findlay- 
Wellisz analysis of  the struggle between monolithic factions. 
Dual concepts again facilitate the analysis. Let VT(qM,qF,Y)  be the 
maximum utility of  farmers given a price qF for food, a price q,,,  for 
manufactures, and  an  income  Y.  We  assume that  the farmers’ sole 
income is farm profits. If  manufactures were the numeraire, then their 
maximand would be VT(l,p,RT-  wLT). If  food were the numeraire, 
then their maximand would be VT(l/p,l,{RT  -  wLT}/p).  Since the in- 
direct utility function is homogeneous of  degree zero in prices and in- 
come, these two maximands are identical; i.e., the choice of numeraire is 
immaterial. 
The first-order condition for a maximum of  VT(l,p,  RT - wLT) is 
(4)  av  ap  av  d 
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If  DT(p,Y)  is the farmers'  demand function for food, then by  Roy's 
formula (Varian 1978, p. 93) 
Dividing (4)  by aV/aY and using the dual relations (1) and (5), we can 
reduce (4)  to 
aP 
aLT 
(F- oT)  -  = w + (LT  + LK) 
1- 
(-+-.-  aw  aw  ap 
aLT  ap  aLT 
This differs from the profit-maximizing condition (2) in that the price 
effect of lobbying, apIaLT,  applies not to all f'units of food produced but 
only to those F - DT  units sold outside the farming faction. 
A similar analysis shows that if DK  is the demand for food by manufac- 
turers, then their utility is maximized when 
1. 
(-+-.-  aw  aw  ap 
aLK  ap  aLK 
This differs from the profit-maximizing condition (3) in that account is 
taken of the price effect of lobbying on the food expenditure of manufac- 
turers. Equations (6) and (7) would reduce to (2) and (3) only if  neither 
faction consumed any food. 
Notes 
1. Errors in the oral version of  these comments were pointed out by T. N. Srinivasan, 
John Chipman, and Paul Krugman. Avinash Dixit and Robert Feenstra also provided  useful 
comments. D. C. McNickle and F. T. Baird carried out the numerical calculations. 
2. Fuller details of  the derivation are given in Young (1980). 
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